Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Public choice: Public choice theory applies economic analysis to political decision-making. It examines how individuals' self-interest and incentives influence public policy outcomes, elections, and government actions. This theory suggests that politicians, voters, and bureaucrats act rationally to maximize their own interests, shaping government behavior and policies, often leading to an understanding of public decision-making through an economic lens.
See also Rationality, Decisions, Decision-making processes, Decision theory, Politics, Economy, Behavioral economics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Economic Theories on Public Choice - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 181 Public Choice/Economic theories/Farber: The term "public choice" is used in a variety of ways, as are related terms (Mashaw 2010(1) p. 19; Gersen, 2010(2), p. 333). Some political scientists view the term as connected with a specific school of thought derived from the work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock; they prefer the term "positive political theory" for the broader topic. Legal scholars tend to use the terms interchangeably. Farber: [For the investigation of institutions] (…) we can bypass this terminological issue and define public choice as analysis of government and political behavior based on models of individual choice (which is usually assumed to be instrumentally rational). Political science: From this perspective, political science is largely the study of collective action problems (Shepsle, 2010(3), p. 355). Public choice theory: The term "public choice theory" is often used to describe the field, (…) public choice is less a unified theory than a research strategy (Ginsburg, 2002(4), pp. 132-133). There are three elements of this strategy: (1) the use of simplified models to describe collective behavior, (2) decomposition of collective behavior into individual behavior, and (3) analysis of individual behavior based on instrumental rationality. The goal of this research strategy is to gain "a rigorous and realistic understanding of decision-making in government institutions" (Jacobi, 2010(5), p. 233). >Social Choice Theory, >Law/Positive Political Theory, >Public Law/Public Choice Theory. 1. Mashaw, J. (2010). "Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 19-48. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Gersen, J. E. (2010). "Designing Agencies," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 3 33—361. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 3. Shepsle, K. A. (2010). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. 2nd edition. New York: W.W. Norton & co. 4. Ginsburg, T. (2002). "Ways of Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricisms and the Theory in Legal Scholarship." University of Illinois Law Review 4: 1 139-1166. 5. Jacobi, T. (2010). "The Judiciary," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 234—259. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Economic Theories Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Public Choice
